We first voiced our concern about an obscure accounting rule that allows companies to “create” profits when purchasing other businesses in the “Curious Case of Miller Energy’s 10-K and Its Huge Bargain Purchase.”  The offending tenet relates to the treatment of something called “negative goodwill” which purportedly is created when a company makes an acquisition, and pays less than what the assets are worth.  This fantastic “bargain purchase” creates a negative goodwill anomaly because the acquirer supposedly gets more assets than it pays for, as in this example:

 

Net working capital acquired

$3,125,000

Property, plant, and equipment

  7,200,000

Long-term debt

  (1,500,000)

Total net assets acquired

  8,825,000

Purchase price

  5,000,000

Negative goodwill

(excess of fair value over cost)

    $3,825,000

So, what’s the problem?  Well, the acquirer now gets to book the entire $3.8 million of negative goodwill into earnings on the date of the transaction!  And as we saw in the case of Miller Energy, the profit contribution can be staggering.  Hence, our assertion…need profit, buy something!

When Statement of Financial Standards No. 141(R), Business Combinations, was issued in December 2007, we simply couldn’t foresee how managers would create an “income opportunity” for themselves from what would initially appear to be such a rare event.  Much to our chagrin, more and more companies seem to be availing themselves of this income enhancing “opportunity.”

In addition to Miller Energy, we recently stumbled across examples of bargain purchase gains in 2011 at Under Armour (UA) and Cenveo (CVO).  At Under Armour, the Company recorded a $3.3 million gain on the acquisition of $63.8 million in land, building, tenant improvements and third party lease-related intangible assets (see Annual Report, note 4, pages 56 and 57 for details) for a purchase price of $60.5 million. The purchase price consisted of the assumption of a $38.6 million loan and cash of $21.9 million.  Under Armour explained its great fortune in the following way:

 The Company believes that it was able to negotiate the acquisition of the net assets for less than fair value because the seller marketed the property in a limited manner, and thus the property did not have adequate exposure to the market prior to the measurement date to allow for marketing activities that are usual and customary for real estate transactions.

Ah, we should have guessed…the lazy seller explanation!  And if, booking this gain is not enough to make your skin crawl, guess where it was buried in the Company’s income statement?  You don’t really have that many choices with Under Armour given the limited P&L detail that the Company provides, but if you had guessed “selling, general and administrative expenses,” you would be correct (see Annual Report page 39).  Why there?  To get the gain in income from operations, of course.  Last time we checked, Under Armour was in the business of selling sports apparel, not buying and selling real estate.

Then, there is the case of Cenveo which reported a $11.7 million gain on its acquisition of Envelope Product Group, in a year where it recorded a net loss of $8.6 million.  Cenveo acquired net assets of $66.9 million for a purchase price of $55.2 million to trigger the “gain.”  According to the Company:

 It was able to acquire EPG for less than the fair value of its net assets due to its operating results prior to the Company’s acquisition and given its parent company’s desire to exit a non-core business.

Unlike Under Armour, at least Cenveo had the accounting sense to report the “gain” outside of operating income in its own income statement line item.

And the banking industry paid great attention to the details in FASB’s statement, having structured a number of these transactions.  Here are some recent examples of banks that participated in this bonanza, as disclosed in recent quarterly reports and earnings announcements:

  • Capital One had a bargain purchase gain of $594 million when it acquired ING Direct;
  • Republic Bankcorp enjoyed a gain of $28 million on its purchase of Tennessee Commerce Bank and has expressed an interest in obtaining more bargain purchases of failed banks;
  • Pacific Premier Bancorp had a purchase gain of $5 million because of its acquisition of Palm Desert National Bank.

Aarti Kanjani claims that since 2010 banks have reported at least $1.6 billion of bargain purchase gains.  Indeed, some opportunists are advertising their services for those who would like to take pleasure in these gains.

So, why is this latest “accounting gimmicky” taking hold?  Very simply, managers are allowed to set the values of the assets that they buy.  If an acquirer believes that the purchased assets are worth more than the amount paid, then management gets to book the difference as a gain.  This is giving us flashbacks to the days of the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980’s, when thrifts debited loan assets and credited income from loan fees on speculative real estate development loans! Of course, we are probably the only ones who remember those days…

The FASB needs to wake up on this issue…it screwed up in allowing the gain to be booked as part of income from continuing operations.  In paragraph 36 of SFAS No. 141(R), it acknowledged that bargain purchases were not routine or common, when it used the word “occasionally” to describe their frequency.  We believe that “extraordinary gain” treatment would greatly improve transparency for such gains since they clearly meet the “unusual” and “infrequent” criteria.  This might also reduce management incentives to play the bargain purchase “game” since any gains would be highlighted as extraordinary, clearly outside of operating income.  We would like to point out that this was how the gain was reported prior to SFAS No. 141(R).

Alternatively, maybe the FASB should rethink its indulgence of fair value measurements, especially those not associated with a market value.  These measurements allow managers to fulfill their dreams, especially as they are essentially unauditable.

At the risk of boring our readers with a bit of logic and theory, does it really make sense that income can result from simply the purchase of assets, rather than their actual use?  Not to us.

And then there is the issue of reporting symmetry.  How is it that negative goodwill is immediately recorded as income, but positive goodwill is NOT expensed, but recorded as an asset? GOTCHA!  As Walter Schuetze pointed out years ago, goodwill isn’t much of an asset since you cannot sell it (see “Goodwill Games”).

Oh, for the good old days, when income was recorded when it was earned.  Well, we are off to the mall to make some bargain purchases (summer sales days are upon us) and generate some income.

 

 This essay reflects the opinion of the authors and not necessarily the opinions of The Pennsylvania State University, The American College, or Villanova University.

 

 

10 Responses to “NEED PROFIT? BUY SOMETHING!”

  1. Tom says:

    Ah, bargain gains. A great way to incur a larger impairment charge later on!

    I know I’m from the paleolithic era, but I still prefer amortization of goodwill. I realize that amortization has its own problems, but it has the benefit of bringing acquisitions closer to organic growth.

    If you grow organically, then you never build up any goodwill on the balance sheet — and what’s more, you’ve indirectly paid for all the intangibles over time through salaries, marketing expenses, etc.

    If you amortize goodwill, then it’s the equivalent of paying for the intangibles over a long period of time. Granted, the 40-year horizon is artificial, but it’s still better than not paying for it at all. With the current state of impairment testing, you might never have to pay for goodwill on the income statement — even though the cash undeniably disappeared.

    Of course, amortization of goodwill would also discourage recognizing bargain gains. It’d result in a higher amortization charge, and we all know that managers *hate* lowered earnings — they play all sorts of value-destroying games just to book better earnings.

  2. Ryan Ohlson says:

    The example of Under Armour is astounding! It would be like if my wife returns from the grocery store telling me she generated $100 of income by buying $200 worth of groceries. If she did that for a living we’d be broke!

    Great story fellas – always enjoy your rants!

  3. mike says:

    If the company was NOT being acquired and considered this the fair value of its assets wouldn’t the seller just consider this an asset impairment write off?

    As alluded to above, do these acquisitions below cost result in an impairment charge to earnings later on? Any data on that? I’ve heard that about 2/3 of acquisitions never really result in accretive earnings.

  4. Paul Polinski says:

    Especially timely article, given the FAF’s call for post-implementation review of FAS no. 141R. The best example I have seen is JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of WaMu’s net assets after WaMu collapsed and was taken over by the government. JPMC’s footnote shows how the $38.8 billion in net assets acquired were whittled down to $3.85 billion through fair value adjustments, still resulting in a gain of $1.9 billion. JPMC and all firms in this position can choose among measuring large assets on the balance sheet and/or significant gains flowing to the income statement (both, under the right circumstances!).

  5. Liseth says:

    Buying a bargain company is always a good way to invest money!!!

    comprar terreno

    • edketz says:

      True, but that’s not where the problem is. The weak spot in the theory is managers measuring the fair value of net assets received and thus measuring the profit to be made. Until the inherent bias is removed or tamped down, one must question the existence and the measurement of acquisition gains.

  6. yves says:

    Since the companies above received the blessings of their auditors, shouldn’t we assume they really paid less than the fair values?

  7. steve mccoy says:

    Groupon just did the same thing this quarter. They contributed cash and theeir stake in a failing Chinese daily-deal business in exchange for a minority stake in a restructured entity. Groupon was able to write up this as a $56m gain even the Chinese business has not been profitable, nor is it likely to be profitable in the future. Great accounting at work.

    I also wonder why groupon’s balance sheet does not show any inventory amount even though the company is clearly stating that they are taking inventory risk for “groupon goods”. I understand they could use the same kind of accounting as Priceline does on the travel/hotel offerings. But how can they show ZERO inventory for the physical “groupon goods”? Please help me understand this.

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